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NOTES
served appeared on the day calendar for trial, and several adjourn-
ments had been had at defendant's request. In denying defendant's
application, Special Term characterized his actions as dilatory tactics
and a waiver of the right of arbitration.10 4
Conclusion
The impartial prohibitions of a time limitation often preclude
redress for a just claim through arbitration. When the legislature
enacts a statute of limitations, thereby sacrificing individual justice
to the needs of the majority, it must carefully weigh its decision in
order that the time set is reasonable. Since contractual limitations
have a similar effect upon bona fide claims, the courts should see to
it that reasonable necessity and not caprice justifies their enforcement.
In view of the confusion confronting the bench and the bar with re-
spect to these contractual limitations, it would appear that an amend-
ment to Section 1448 of the Civil Practice Act should be made. This
amendment would state in substance that no agreement or contract
shall be valid which limits the period within which notice of claim
must be given, or a claim filed, to a period of less than 90 days. It
is submitted that such a period is just and reasonable in every situa-
tion that might arise, yet would prevent such a limitation from being
a mere cloak for denial of a remedy.
SOME PROBLEMS OF DUAL NATIONALITY
Introduction
Citizenship is regulated by municipal, rather than international
law.1 Each nation forms its own rules as to the manner in which its
citizenship may be acquired and in which it may be terminated. In
determining a person's nationality at birth, some nations adhere to
the doctrine of jus soli, i.e., citizenship is determined by birth within
the country. In others the status depends upon Jus sanguinis, i.e.,
nationality is inherited from the parents regardless of place of birth.
104 Accord, Burton v. Klaw, 129 N. Y. L. J. 329, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 29,
1953); Matter of De Costa, 123 N. Y. L. J. 123, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 11,
1950).
' See Perkins v. Elg, 307 U. S. 325, 329 (1939) ; Tomasicchio v. Acheson,
98 F. Supp. 166, 169 (D. D. C. 1951); see Note, 25 MINN. L. REv. 348(1941).
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A third group, which includes the United States, confers citizenship
under both theories.2 The most common method of acquiring a par-
ticular nationality after birth is, of course, through the procedure of
naturalization. Ordinarily, one who takes advantage of such a pro-
cedure renounces all former allegiances. However, not all nations
recognize such renunciation.3 As a consequence of this lack of uni-
formity among the various nationality laws, there exists the possibility
of a person's being simultaneously claimed as a citizen by more than
one sovereign. Such a person is said to possess dual nationality, a
status long recognized by the law.4
For the sake of convenience in treatment, dual nationals may be
classified into two general groups: first, those who acquire such status
at birth, and secondly, those who acquire it subsequently thereto. In
the first category, with regard to United States citizens, would be
found a child born in this country of alien parents. Under our law,
he would be a citizen of this country and would ordinarily inherit,
as well, the nationality of his parents' native land. Similarly, the
allegiance of one born abroad of American parents would be claimed
not only by the United States, but also, if it operated under jus soli,
by the country of his birth. On the other hand, one born in this
country of United States citizens, who later became naturalized in a
foreign country, would have acquired only a single nationality at
birth, but another upon his parents' naturalization, and thus would
come within the second classification. As a final example, a citizen
of a foreign nation which does not recognize the right of expatriation
will, upon naturalization in this country, possess both nationalities.
These illustrations are of course not intended as exhaustive, but
merely demonstrate some of the more common sources of dual
allegiance.
The concept of dual citizenship presupposes that a person may
possess, at the same time, certain rights of nationality in more than
one country and, conversely, be burdened with responsibilities to
both.5 Inevitably such a situation has led to friction and difficulty.
It is the purpose of this article to discuss some of the more important
problems resulting from such a seemingly anomalous status and the
attempts made to resolve them both by the courts and by Congress.
2 See Tomasiccbio v. Acheson, supra note 1 at 168; see Note, 25 MINN.
L. REV. 348 (1941).
s See Gualco v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 760, 761 (N. D. Cal. 1952); see
Orfield, The Legal Effects of Dual Nationality, 17 Gao. WASH. L. Ray. 427
(1949).
4See Kawakita v. United States, 343 U. S. 717, 723 (1952); Savorgnan





Expatriation contemplates a complete severance between the in-
dividual and the nation of which he is a citizen. The early common-
law position was that such a severance could be accomplished only
with the consent of the sovereign. 6 To some extent this view per-
sisted in the United States 7 until the year 1868 when Congress de-
clared expatriation to be a ". . . natural and inherent right of all
people, indispensable to the enjoyment of the rights of life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness ... ," and that any promulgation which
restricted this right in any manner would be ". . . inconsistent with
the fundamental principles of this government." s Although this pro-
nouncement had for its primary purpose the protection of those immi-
grating to this country from abroad, 9 it had the effect as well of rec-
ognizing the right of American citizens to voluntarily renounce their
allegiance. The question of ascertaining just what was necessary to
evidence the intent of expatriation was left to the Department of
State. In 1907, however, Congress passed the Nationality Act of
that year 10 in which it listed certain acts the performance of which
resulted in loss of nationality.'" The Act was amended in 1940 and
a more comprehensive enumeration was accomplished by retaining
some of the provisions of the old law, while substantially enlarging
the grounds for loss of citizenship.' 2 Some further modifications
were attached in 1952.'1
The problems to be dealt with herein deal largely with the in-
terpretation accorded the Nationality Acts and the apparent conflict
between the traditional view that expatriation is voluntary,' 4 and
divestiture of citizenship under the statutory enumerations. While,
as indicated above, attention will primarily be given to the area of the
dual national, it is to be noted that not all the difficulties are exclu-
sively confined to that field.
OSee Mandoli v. Acheson, 344 U. S. 133, 135 (1952); Savorgnan v.
United States, supra note 4 at 498.7 See Shanks v. Dupont, 3 Pet. 242, 246 (U. S. 1830).8 15 STAT. 223-224 (1868).
9 See Developments in the a w-Immigration and Nationality, 66 HARv.
L. REv. 643, 732 (1953).10 See 34 STAT. 1228 (1907).
2" The overt acts enumerated therein were: naturalization in a foreign state,
oath of allegiance to a foreign state, and marriage of an American Woman
to a foreigner.
12 54 STAT. 1168 (1940), 8 U. S. C. § 801 et seq. (1946).
13 66 STAT. 267, 8 U. S. C. A. § 1481 (Supp. 1952). Actually, the 1940
Act was repealed and re-enacted with the modification.
14 See note 8 supra; Ex parte Griffin, 237 Fed. 445 (N. D. N. Y. 1916).
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Right of Election
The earliest cases presenting the problem of right of election in
connection with dual nationality were those involving a minor child
born here whose parents became naturalized in a foreign country, or,
if they were naturalized Americans, who resumed their former al-
legiance to the country of their origin. Prior to 1939, there was a
measure of uncertainty concerning the effect of such action upon the
status of the minor. A very early opinion recognized a right of elec-
tion in favor of the child permitting him to choose between the two
nationalities upon attaining majority. 15 The Nationality Act of 1907,
however, included naturalization abroad as a ground for loss of citi-
zenship,16 and this principle was interpreted as applying to minors
who acquired foreign citizenship derivatively through their parents'
naturalization."7 Thus it was held that the resumption of Norwegian
allegiance by a father previously naturalized in the United States
terminated the American citizenship of his American-born daughter
because it conferred Norwegian nationality upon her.1 8  This result
was given sanction in the federal courts in a case differing factually
only to the extent that it involved foreign naturalization of a native-
born parent rather than resumption of original nationality.' 9 As in
the previous case, the minor was held to have been deprived of Amer-
ican citizenship through the act of the parent.
When the issue eventually reached the Supreme Court in Perkins
v. Elg,20 the minor's right of election was reinstated in the law. Miss
Elg was born in the United States of naturalized parents of Swedish
origin. At the age of four years, she was taken to Sweden by her
mother; there her father resumed his allegiance to that nation. By
virtue of his action, Swedish citizenship was also conferred on Miss
Elg.21 Upon reaching her majority, she applied for an American
passport and returned to this country, where, some five years later,
deportation proceedings were instituted against her on the ground
that she had previously become expatriated. The Court held that she
had not lost her citizenship by what amounted to derivative naturaliza-
tion in Sweden 22 and that she had elected, by returning here at
majority, to retain her American nationality which she acquired at
birth.
15 Steinkauler's Case, 15 Ops. Air'y GEx. 15 (1875).
1634 STAT. 1228 (1907).
17 The principle was similarly interpreted when found in treaties.
18 Citizenship of Ingrid Tobiassen, 36 Oss. ATifY GEN. 535 (1932).
19 United States v. Reid, 73 F. 2d 153 (9th Cir. 1934).
20307 U. S. 325 (1939).
21 Under a Swedish-American treaty of 1869, the resumption of residence
in Sweden repatriated the father and also, the court assumed, his minor child.
Id. at 336-337.
22 It was pointed out that an infant is incapable of a binding choice and
hence such naturalization could not be considered voluntary. Id. at 334.
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NOTES
The rule in the Eig case was included in the Nationality Act
of 1940. Under Section 401(a) ,23 a person who is a citizen of this
country becomes expatriated upon his naturalization in a foreign
country or upon the naturalization of a parent having legal custody
over him; provided, however, that the nationality of the child shall
not be lost until he fails to make an election by acquiring permanent
residence here prior to his twenty-third birthday. Thus did Con-
gress go further in prescribing a definite mode in which the election
is to be evidenced and a time limitation within which it must be ex-
ercised. This limitation was extended by two years in 1952.24
Since any citizen of the United States has a right to renounce
his allegiance should he so choose,25 it follows that one who acquired
an additional nationality at birth has an equal right to elect either
one at majority or even, presumably, to renounce both (subject to
any foreign laws). In that sense, a dual national who became such
at birth has always had a right of election. Whether or not he has a
duty of election such as that imposed upon derivative dual nationals
is a question which has caused considerable confusion. Such a per-
son does not come within Section 401(a) of the 1940 Act because
he did not acquire his dual status derivatively through his parents'
naturalization; on the contrary, he has always possessed it. There is,
however, another section of the statute, Section 407,26 which does
apply to some dual nationals of that class, viz., those in the custody
of naturalized American parents who have resumed their native citi-
zenship. Thus, one born of alien parents in the United States, ac-
quiring, as we have seen, two nationalities, but whose parents later
become naturalized Americans and then resume their native nation-
ality, will come within this section. Under its provisions, the minor
is obliged to make an election in the same manner as the minor under
Section 401 (a).
The Act omitted, on the other hand, to make any provision re-
garding one born here of alien parents who never became naturalized.
Must he too make an election at majority to avoid forfeiture of his
American citizenship? This question was answered in the negative
in Tonasicchio v. Acheson 27 where the court distinguished certain
State Department opinions, seemingly to the opposite effect, by point-
ing out that they were there considering the question of election of
dual nationals with regard only to the extension of protection to such
a citizen while he resides abroad. There is a vast difference, said
the court, between ". . . loss of citizenship and deprivation of the
privilege of protection . ,, 28 Subsequently, however, the federal
2354 STAT. 1168 (1940), 8 U. S. C. § 801(a) (1946).
2466 STAT. 267, 8 U. S. C. A. § 1481(a) (Supp. 1952).
25 15 STAT. 223-224 (1868).
2854 STAT. 1170 (1940), 8 U. S. C. §807 (1946).
2798 F. Supp. 166 (D. D. C. 1951).
28 Id. at 172.
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court of appeals, in Mandoli v. Acheson,29 decided that such a con-
clusion was erroneous. Relying on the doctrine of Perkins v. Elg,
it was held that a person born in the United States of alien Italian
parents forfeited his citizenship upon failure to elect when he reached
twenty-one. This case was followed in Mazza v. Acheson.30  The
distinction between these cases and Perkins v. Eig is obvious, how-
ever. While in the latter case the defendant attained dual nationality
derivatively through her parents' resumption of original nationality
(which legally amounted to renaturalization), the petitioners in the
former obtained it at birth. Miss Elg could reasonably have been
said to come within Section 2 of the 1907 Act,31 but Mandoli and
Mazza were never naturalized even derivatively, and so they fall
within no statutory provision regulating expatriation. Accordingly,
the Supreme Court reversed the holding in the Mandoli case 3 2 on
statutory grounds while asserting, in addition, that even in the Rig
case the result of failure to elect was not affirmatively decided be-
cause, Miss Elg having actually elected, the question was not squarely
presented.
When the Nationality Act was amended in 1952, a section was
added to cover the foregoing situation. A dual national from birth
"... who has voluntarily sought or claimed benefits of the nationality
of any foreign state . . ." will, under this provision, lose his Amer-
ican citizenship by having a continuous residence for three years in
the foreign state of which he is a national any time after attaining
the age of twenty-two. 88 This provision is undoubtedly an attempt
to reduce the instances of dual nationality by requiring election in
all cases. It is less apparent, however, why Congress prescribed more
liberal conditions for making such election here than were imposed
in the case of derivative dual citizens. In order to avoid forfeiture
of American citizenship, the latter are required to return to this
country and establish here a permanent residence, while a dual na-
tional from birth needs only to avoid a three-year continuous resi-
dence in the particular foreign country of which he is a national. It
was the opinion of at least one court that the distinction in the 1940
Act, in failing to require any election by dual nationals from birth,
was arbitrary and that it left the statute open to attack on constitu-
29 193 F. 2d 920 (D. C. Cir. 1952).
30 104 F. Supp. 157 (N. D. Cal. 1952). The decision here was based upon
statutory grounds while in the Mandoli case reliance was placed on the
Supreme Court's decision in Perkiis v. Eig.
31 Which section provided for forfeiture of citizenship upon naturaliza-
tion in a foreign country.
32 Mandoli v. Acheson, 344 U. S. 133 (1952).
33 66 STAT. 269, 8 U. S. C. A. § 1482 (Supp. 1952). Two major exceptions
are included to the effect that loss of citizenship may be avoided (1) by
taking an oath of allegiance to the United States before the expiration of the




tional grounds.3 4 While the 1952 provision reduces this inequality,
there nevertheless remains a distinction and if it could be considered
arbitrary to distinguish through omission to provide for one class in
1940, it is no less arbitrary to expressly distinguish, although the
distinction lies only in the method of election, in the 1952 amendment.
As was said in Gualco v. Acheson, "[s]tatutes that arbitrarily dis-
criminate are dangerous and unfair. Particularly is this so when so
valuable and important [a] right as that of American citizenship is
at stake." 35
Divestiture under the Nationality Act
Included among the methods of forfeiting American citizenship
in the 1940 Act were: entering or serving in the armed forces of a
foreign state; 3 6 taking an oath of allegiance to a foreign state; 7 and
voting in a political election of a foreign state.38  There were, of
course, other means provided, but during the period of war and
post-war upheaval which followed the passage of the Act, the three
mentioned were those with which the courts were most frequently
confronted. Since these methods were stated in an absolute and un-
qualified manner, it became the task of the judiciary to reconcile
them with the traditional concept of expatriation as a voluntary right
existing for the benefit of the individual.
The most commonly employed "escape" from the rigidity of the
statute as it stood was a construction which required, in addition to
the act itself, the intent of expatriation. In order to attribute this
intent to one who performed the proscribed act, such performance
must have been voluntary.39 However, if the petitioner were free to
choose at the time of performance, mere ignorance of the conse-
quences would not avail him.40 The courts have therefore refused
to apply the provisions of the statute if there could be found some
factor negating the idea of voluntary action. Duress became the
common defense in this type of proceeding.
The inherent difficulty in such a theory involved, of course, the
determination of what constituted duress. As to this the courts were
frequently in disagreement. Mere expediency, it was said, is not
34See Gualco v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 760, 769 (N. D. Cal. 1952).
3 5Ibid.
3 54 STAT. 1168 (1940), 8 U. S. C. § 801(c) (1946). This section applied
only to those vho had or who acquired by such service the nationality of the
foreign state. In 1952, this limitation was omitted, thus applying to other
than dual nationals. 66 STAT. 267, 8 U. S. C. A. § 1481 (a) (Supp. 1952).
3754 STAT. 1168 (1940), 8 U. S. C. §801(b) (1946).
38Id. at 1169, 8 U. S. C. § 801(e).
39 See Podea v. Acheson, 179 F. 2d 306 (2d Cir. 1950) ; Doreau v. Marshall,
170 F. 2d 721 (3d Cir. 1948).
40 See Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U. S. 491 (1950); Federici v.
Miller, 99 F. Supp. 962 (W. D. Pa. 1951).
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duress; 41 nevertheless, it has been held that fear of displeasing the
authorities and fear of social ostracism were together sufficient to
avoid the effect of voting in the Japanese elections of 1946.42 Induc-
tion into foreign military service is generally regarded as service
under compulsion; 43 but one judge ruled that where petitioner did
not resist induction his action was voluntary.44 This result was based
on the congressional design, implicit in the statute, to discourage dual
nationality. In another case, it was reasoned that even if the fact
of induction did overcome the effect of the statute, the circumstance
that petitioner was promoted in the Italian army showed that he had
"served" loyally within the meaning of the section and was thereby
expatriated.45  Although courts generally frowned upon the practice
of putting on or removing American citizenship for convenience as
one might a cloak, duress has been established despite the feeling of
the judge that petitioner ". . . stood upon his rights as either a citizen
of the United States or a subject of Japan alternatively as best suited
" 46his personal purpose, pleasure, comfort and convenience ...
Obviously, such variation among the judiciary caused much injustice.
A person's citizenship came to depend less upon any settled rules
of construction than upon the attitude of the particular court which
happened to be reviewing his petition. The standard of judgment,
as was charged against the early Equity courts, varied with the size
of the "Chancellor's foot."
In this area was a further inequity. Persons who voted in oc-
cupied Germany or Japan under the mistaken notion that they were
cooperating with the United States were conclusively presumed to
have forfeited their citizenship if they acted voluntarily.47 When the
defense of duress was unavailable to them, some decisions afforded
relief by holding that nations under American military occupation
were not "foreign states" within the meaning of the statute,48 or that
elections therein were not "political." 49 In the main, however, such
a construction was felt to do violence to the common-sense meaning
41 ,.. [T]he forsaking of American citizenship, even in a difficult situ-
ation, as a matter of expediency, with attempted excuse of such conduct later
when crass material considerations suggest that course, is not duress." Doreau
v. Marshall, supra note 39 at 724. See also McGrath v. Abo, 186 F. 2d 766,
771 (7th Cir. 1951).
42 Nakashima v. Acheson, 98 F. Supp. 11 (S. D. Cal. 1951); cf. Kai v.
Acheson, 94 F. Supp. 383 (S. D. Cal. 1950).
43 Ishikawa v. Acheson, 85 F. Supp. 1 (D. Hawaii 1949); see Mandoli
v. Acheson, 344 U. S. 133, 135 (1952).
44Kondo v. Acheson, 98 F. Supp. 884 (S. D. Cal. 1951); Hamamoto V.
Acheson, 98 F. Supp. 904 (S. D. Cal. 1951).
45 Perri v. Acheson, 105 F. Supp. 434 (D. N. J. 1952).
46 Ishikawa v. Acheson, supra note 43.
4 See Nakashima v. Acheson, 98 F. Supp. 11, 12 (S. D. Cal. 1951).
48 Furusho v. Acheson, 94 F. Supp. 1021 (D. Hawaii 1951); Yamamoto
v. Acheson, 93 F. Supp. 346 (D. Ariz. 1950).
45 Furusho v. Acheson, supra note 48.
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of those words. s0 The petitioners were reluctantly denied citizenship
because, as one judge pointed out, they ". . . are beyond the help of
the courts. Only Congress can rescue them from their plight." 51
A radical departure from the general pattern of decisions is
found in Okirnura v. Acheson.52 As in many of the cases, the peti-
tioner was from birth a national of both the United States and Japan.
During the war he was inducted into the Japanese army and later
voted in the elections there. His application for an American pass-
port was denied on the ground that he had lost his citizenship under
Sections 401(a) and (e) of the Act. The district court in Hawaii,
rather than attenipt to take petitioner outside the operation of the
statute, held instead that the sections involved were unconstitutional.
Judge McLaughlin reasoned that since the test of citizenship by birth
is a constitutional one, Congress has no power to interfere with it
in any manner. Refusing to admit that the right of expatriation
could be made a "liability" through congressional legislation, the
court asserted that the only way a native American can be deprived
of his birthright is by foreign naturalization proceedings. Upon ap-
peal, the Supreme Court remanded the case for specific findings con-
cerning petitioner's service in the Japanese army, his voting and the
inferences to be drawn therefrom.5 3 By so doing, the Court avoided
the issue of constitutionality and permitted a result in harmony
with the weight of authority since there certainly existed factors suf-
ficient to warrant a conclusion based on coercion. The merits, how-
ever, of Judge McLaughlin's strict constitutional interpretation re-
main undetermined and one can but speculate as to the result should
the Supreme Court be squarely confronted with the issue in a
future case.
Treason
Of necessity, one who owes allegiance to more than a single
nation is placed in a peculiarly precarious position should those
countries become antagonistic toward one another. He has obliga-
tions toward both which, in the event of war, would be in direct con-
flict, performance on one side constituting a breach on the other.
As a general rule, the primary allegiance of a dual national is to the
nation in which he resides. However, that does not mean he owes
50 See Acheson v. Wohlmuth, 196 F. 2d 866 (D. C. Cir. 1952) ; Acheson v.
IKuniyuki, 189 F. 2d 741 (9th Cir. 1951); Kuwahara v. Acheson, 96 F. Supp.
38 (S. D. Cal. 1951); Uyeno v. Acheson, 96 F. Supp. 510 (W. D. Wash.
1951).
S Nakashima v. Acheson, mtpra note 47 at 12.
5299 F. Supp. 587 (D. Hawaii 1951). Also decided on the same ground
was Murata v. Acheson, 99 F. Supp. 591 (D. Hawaii 1951).
53 Acheson v. Okimura, 342 U. S. 899 (1952). The Murata case was simi-
larly disposed of in Acheson v. Murata, 342 U. S. 900 (1952).
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no loyalty whatsoever to the other country which also claims him as
a citizen.5 4 It is true, with regard to American citizens, that per-
formance of the deeds set forth in the Nationality Act has the effect
of immediate expatriation, with the result that the actor would no
longer be a dual citizen. On the other hand, activity which the
statute does not encompass may nevertheless give "aid and comfort"
to the enemy and, since expatriation would not flow therefrom, form
the basis for a charge of treason. In fact, with war as we know it
today, the very circumstance that one must earn a living in an enemy
nation might very well aid them in the struggle.55
It would appear, therefore, that the only course available to one
in such a situation is to make an open and unequivocal election be-
tween the two belligerents. This was the suggestion of the Supreme
Court in Kawakita v. United States.5 6 The defendant pleaded loss
of citizenship under the Nationality Act of 1940 but the actions re-
lied upon were found insufficient to support such a claim.57 Since
Kawakita was a citizen of the United States at the time of the ac-
tivity for which he was tried, the jury's verdict of guilt was upheld.
Of course such a person would not be convicted of treason if his per-
formance was the result of force or coercion. 58 This element lack-
ing, however, he can not turn his status into one of ".... fair-weather
citizenship, retaining it for possible contingent benefits but meanwhile
playing the part of the traitor." 19
Conclusion
The deleterious effects produced by the status of dual nationality
both upon the individual and upon the nations involved in his dis-
putes are such that, in the interests of justice and international har-
mony, the possibilities of such a status arising should be reduced to
a minimum. Ideally, this should be the collective goal of all the na-
tions of the world but, for a variety of reasons, there has existed on
the part of many a reluctance to surrender claims to allegiance even
when based upon little or no foundation.60 The Congress of the
United States has attempted to alleviate the problem with regard to
its own citizenry through legislative enactments, some of which were
54 See Kawakita v. United States, 343 U. S. 717, 735 (1952).
55 Id. at 734.
56 See note 53 supra.
57 The particular overt acts included: registering in the Koseki, a family
census register; serving as an interpreter for a munitions corporation; paying
respects to the Emperor of Japan; and expressions of hostility toward the
United States.58 See Kawakita v. United States, supra note 54 at 736.
59 Ibid.
60 See Orfield, The Legal Effects of Dual Nationality, 17 Gzo. WASH. L.
Rav. 427, 442 (1949).
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discussed above. Although the goal of such legislation is admirable,
the path has not been entirely free from obstacles. Nevertheless,
until such time as an international cooperative effort is undertaken
to relieve the current situation, there would appear to be no other
course. The injustice produced in certain instances could largely be
remedied by means of a more uniform judicial application. A single,
reasonable standard for determining whether or not actions falling
within the statute were voluntarily performed, and a common sense
adaptation of the election provisions to meet the circumstances of the
particular case,61 would together constitute a safeguard for the in-
calculable privilege of American citizenship while in no way impair-
ing the effectiveness of the Act. The right of expatriation should
remain just that and should not, even for the most praiseworthy end,
be transformed into a penalty.
THE DANGEROUS IMPLICATIONS OF THE STEIN CASE
"American criminal procedure has its defects, though
its essentials have behind them the vindication of long his-
tory. But all systems of law, however wise, are administered
through men and therefore may occasionally disclose the
frailties of men. Perfection may not be demanded of law,
but the capacity to counteract inevitable, though rare,
frailties is the mark of a civilized legal mechanism."
Mr. justice Frankfurter
in Rosenberg v. United States,
73 Sup. Ct. 1152, 1171 (1953).
On June 15, 1953, the Supreme Court of the United States
handed down its opinion in the case of Stein v. New York,'
popularly known as the "Reader's Digest Murder Case." Often the
opinions of a court are noteworthy for their dicta rather than the
61For example, in Gualco v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 760 (N. D. Cal.
1952), petitioner, a dual national, living in Italy, was inducted and served in
the Italian army. He was captured by the Germans and released in ill health
after which he remained in Italy until long past his majority. The court,
nonetheless, held that since his residence since that time was in part involuntary,
due to sickness, he had a reasonable time within which to exercise his right
of election rather than the strict statutory period. He first attempted to
return here 31 months after his release by the Germans and was held not to
have lost his American citizenship.
173 Sup. Ct. 1077 (1953).
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